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Further Questions 
A Way Out of the Present Philosophical Situation       
(via Foucault) 
Leonard Lawlor 
Pennsylvania State University 
Let us begin by assembling some signs of the present philosophical 
situation. On the one hand, the most important living French philosopher, 
Alain Badiou, calls for a “return to Plato,” despite the movement of anti-
Platonism that dominated French and German thought in the 20th century.1 
On the other hand, the present moment sees a resurgence of naturalism in 
philosophy in general (including and especially Anglophone analytic 
philosophy), despite the criticisms of naturalism that have appeared 
throughout the 20th century. Phenomenology seems to be at the center of 
both of these movements. On the one hand, it is the idea of a mathematized 
ontology that requires the return to Plato, a mathematized ontology 
constructed without a reflection on its transcendental grounds. On the other, 
the resurgence of naturalism is so strong that a book could be imagined and 
published with the bastard name of Naturalizing Phenomenology, as if the 
transcendental moment of phenomenology did not transform the very 
meaning of nature.2 These signs seem to indicate that we have entered into a 
phase of regression or even decline in philosophical thinking.3 If this 
interpretation of the signs is correct, if we have indeed entered into a phase 
of regression -- a twofold regression toward Platonism and toward 
naturalism -- we must ask the following question: is it possible for us to 
define something like a project or even a research agenda that would allow 
us to define a way of thinking that might lead us out of the present situation, 
a situation, it must be said, that seems dire for philosophy in general? If we 
can determine such a research agenda, perhaps we can also begin to 
understand what the tradition of “continental philosophy” has stood for. 
The interrogation of what “continental philosophy” stands for allows us 
to approach the idea of exiting the present situation from a different 
perspective. When we reflect on the development of twentieth century 
continental philosophy, we see a dispersion of figures, themes, and ideas. 
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This dispersion accounts for the lack of success in the books so far written 
that aim to define “continental philosophy.”4 Yet, we must ask: is it possible 
to find a way of systematizing the dispersion? Perhaps a system can be 
formed, if we focus on some figures and ignore others, if we suppress some 
ideas and exaggerate others. Perhaps we can form a system if we focus only 
on Bergson, Freud, Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty (which means 
ignoring Adorno, Sartre, Levinas, and Gadamer, for example). Perhaps we 
focus only on these figures with an eye toward how they lead up to what I 
have called “the great French philosophy of the Sixties”: Derrida, Deleuze, 
and Foucault.5 Then perhaps we see a system. In fact, I think that we see four 
conceptual features for what we might call the project of “continental 
philosophy.” Here are the four conceptual features: (1) the starting point in 
immanence (where immanence is understood first as internal, subjective 
experience, but then, due to the universality of the epoche, immanence is 
understood as ungrounded experience6); (2) difference (where difference 
gives way to multiplicity, itself emancipated from an absolute origin and an 
absolute purpose); (3) thought (where thought is understood as language 
liberated from the constraints of logic, and language is understood solely in 
terms of its own being, as indefinite continuous variation); and (4) the 
overcoming of metaphysics (where metaphysics is understood as a mode of 
thinking based in presence, and overcoming is understood as the passage to 
a new mode of thought, a new people and a new land). 
With the first conceptual feature – immanence – we see the irreducible 
role that phenomenology plays in this project. But, the other conceptual 
features indicate a conversion of phenomenology that results neither in 
Platonism nor in naturalism. Thanks to the phrase “the overcoming of 
metaphysics,” we see the central role that Heidegger plays in this 
conversion. It is Heidegger who shows, in 1929, that we can understand 
thought only when we suspend its object, when it is the thought of the 
nothing. It is Heidegger, in 1950, who shows that “language is language”; he 
shows that, grounded in nothing but itself, language opens out over an 
abyss, a void, an outside. It is Heidegger who inspires Foucault’s essay, “The 
Thought of the Outside.” Indeed, this essay will be my focus here.7 
Published in 1966, at the high water mark of “the great French Philosophy of 
the Sixties,” “The Thought of the Outside” “deconstructs” subjective interior 
experience (the cogito) in order to transform it into the experience of the 
outside, in order to show its location within a multiplicity called the being of 
language. It seems to me that “The Thought of the Outside” leads us to an 
overcoming of metaphysics, due to the fact that it leads us to a new sort of 
experience. Our basic question becomes: what is the experience to which 
Foucault in “The Thought of the Outside” is leading us? If we are able to 
find ourselves within this new experience, perhaps we find as well a way 
out of the present philosophical situation. Of course, the idea of exiting from 
the present philosophical situation is nothing but a negative idea. If there is, 
however, positive content to the idea of exiting, it will be found only in the 
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form of conditions for questions, for “further questions,” hence the title of 
my essay. At the end of the essay we shall formulate these further questions 
for thinking. 
 
Foucault’s “Thought of the Outside” 
The Foucault essay is quite famous (since, among other reasons, 
Deleuze cites it frequently in his book on Foucault8). It concerns what 
Foucault calls modern literature, and the primary example he takes up is 
Maurice Blanchot’s writings. Along with his 1964 essay, “Madness, the 
Absence of Work,” “The Thought of the Outside” is one of Foucault’s main 
reflections on the being of language. The essay is important for us because it 
shows how to transform internal, subjective experience, the very idea of 
immanence, into a very different experience. Across the experience of the 
double, it goes to the experience of powerlessness. And from powerlessness, 
it goes to the experience of awaiting-forgetting, which is, of course, the 
experience of time. Before we turn to the experience of time, however, which 
will be taken up in the next section (in fact, what we shall take up there is an 
experience prior to the division of space and time), let us turn now to “The 
Thought of the Outside.” 
The essay can be summarized in four points. First, “The Thought of the 
Outside,” as I just mentioned, amounts to a “deconstruction” of subjective, 
internal experience.9 Second, the deconstruction takes place by suspending 
the transitivity of speaking. Instead of saying “I am speaking about (or of) 
something,” I say, according to Foucault, “I speak” without any object.10 For 
Foucault, when I suspend the transitivity of speech, I find myself located 
within an indefinite or even an infinite supporting discourse, a discourse 
that becomes definite and limited only with the speaking of or about one 
thing. In that suspension, the “I” of the “I speak,” the “I,” that is, internal 
subjective experience is no longer a sovereign subject functioning as the 
origin of speaking; it becomes nothing more than a relay. So, third, as a relay 
to something other than itself, the experience of the inside becomes the 
experience of the outside. In “The Thought of the Outside,” Foucault calls 
the outside “an informal murmur,” that is, a multiplicity of pre-formal or 
non-formal linguistic traits.11 In 1961, in The History of Madness in the Classical 
Age, Foucault calls this multiplicity the “murmur of dark insects”12; in 1969, 
in The Archeology of Knowledge, he calls it “the archive.” Then the fourth 
point: in “The Thought of the Outside,” Foucault determines the multiplicity 
as a kind of double of me. Here, Foucault refers to Blanchot’s writings about 
sirens in relation to Ulysses and about Eurydice in relation Orpheus.13 
Foucault’s determination of the murmur as a double refers to the 
contemporaneous book, The Order of Things, in particular to Chapter Nine, 
“Man and his Doubles.”14 The double, however, in “The Thought of the 
Outside” is not the double of the same; it is an enigmatic presence that 
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draws me out of myself toward the outside. You can see, I hope, that with 
this “deconstruction” of the internal subjective experience, we have 
transformed the very idea of immanence, which is the first conceptual 
feature we laid out in the introduction to this essay. 
 Let us examine more closely the development of the “I speak,” as 
Foucault presents it in “The Thought of the Outside.” Foucault associates the 
“I speak” with the image of a fortress. The image comes about because the “I 
speak” suspends (in the sense of an epoché) both the content of the sentence 
and the supporting discourse of the sentence. It is the suspension of 
transitivity in general. Transitivity being suspended results in the sentence 
being entirely formal. The suspension of transitivity adds another detail to 
the image: now it looks as though a desert surrounds the fortress.15 What the 
image and the suspension indicate is an interiorization -- the “I speak” 
seems to stand all alone, independent, sovereign, like the Cartesian “I think” 
– “unless” the desert, which Foucault calls a “void” (vide: also “emptiness”), 
is “an absolute opening.”16 The phrase “absolute opening” indicates two 
things. On the one hand, the phrase “absolute opening” indicates that the 
fortress is not closed off; the suspension of transitivity, that the sentence has 
no object, that nothing follows the “about” or the “of,” that the sentence 
does not say “I am speaking of ….,” opens the sentence, opens the thinking, 
to what is not interior. It opens the speaking to the outside. The outside for 
Foucault is language. Language, however, is neither a supporting discourse 
nor is it content; it is neither subject nor object. So, on the other hand, the 
phrase “absolute opening” indicates that the void itself is absolute. No longer 
is the foundation the Cartesian cogito, no longer is the foundation 
transcendental conditions of possible experience, no longer is the foundation 
man in his finitude; rather the foundation – if we can call a void a 
foundation – is language “in its raw being” expanding itself “to infinity.” In 
other words, by means of the suspension of transitivity, Foucault has 
transformed the immanence of interiority – the “I” of the “I speak” – into 
immanence of the outside. Immanence is now immanent to the outside 
which is nothing (or which is, to speak like Heidegger, the nothing) – 
nothing but the flow of language. Foucault sets up therefore what Deleuze 
would call a plane of immanence: a movement to infinity that precedes the 
division into thought and matter.17 
 The establishment of a plane of immanence means that, with the 
outside, Foucault is involved in a project of the destruction, in a sort of 
“deconstruction,” as we have said, of metaphysics. The outside in Foucault 
is the outside of subjectivity, but that does not turn the outside into the 
foundation of positivity; the outside is neither subject nor substance. If we 
think of metaphysics in the somewhat infamous phrase that we have 
inherited from Derrida, “the metaphysics of presence,” then we must see 
that the outside in Foucault is an invisibility that “presences” without ever 
becoming visible. It is a stubborn invisibility. The outside is a “presence” 
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that is never manifest, that always dissimulates itself. Indeed, the formulas 
for the outside that Foucault composes indicate that it cannot be defined by 
simple presence that is readily available. As well, for Foucault, the outside is 
not a being, not an individual thing that is; the outside is being where the 
limit defines being. The outside is a limit extending itself to infinity, a 
universality, really a universalization that exceeds every singularity, while 
never attaining a positive form. The outside is a repetition that at the same 
time differentiates.18 Foucault calls it a “neutral space,” a “placeless place. It 
is a multiplicity. 
What we are here calling a multiplicity refers to what Foucault calls 
“language in its raw being.” Language in its raw being means that Foucault, 
as Heidegger did in his 1950 “Language” essay, is not defining language by 
its customary concepts; it is not discourse, not representation; it is not 
defined by the function of communication (which would make it the 
speaking of man); it is not even literature in the sense of a self-referential 
discourse. To indicate the unusual status of language in Foucault, we must 
put the word between quotation marks. Foucault is conceiving “language” 
as a space of dispersion.19 Dispersion implies that “language” is not 
organized around a central meaning, that is either originary or teleological. 
As Foucault says, it is language getting as far away from itself as possible, 
getting away from itself in the sense of getting away from the customary 
senses of “language,” but also in the sense of getting away from pre-
established meaning of words, phrases, and statements. “Language” 
hollows itself out from these already-given meanings. Its universalization 
exceeds anyone and any one statement of it. Exceeding any one statement of 
it, “language” is informal. Exceeding all individuality, “language” therefore 
is not spoken by someone. “Language” makes a network that is anonymous 
and informal. The network “language” forms – the outside -- is prior to the 
forms of subjectivity and to the forms of objectivity. Although Foucault calls 
this plane of the outside archeological, we could call it ultra-transcendental. 
The absence of no one and no meaning means that “language” has a kind of 
silence to it. But the silence is really, as we have already indicated, a 
murmur. This murmur calls, or better, attracts, like the sirens’ song and like 
Eurydice’s face. 
Eurydice and the sirens are companions, doubles. The idea of the 
double refers to the experience of auto-affection, to the monologue of 
subjective, interior experience. Yet, the murmuring of the double transforms 
the experience of auto-affection into that of hetero-affection. When I think, 
when I engage in interior monologue, I experience something other than 
myself, I hear voices other than my own. Merleau-Ponty would say the 
same: the touching-touched relation never achieves unity; the left hand is 
never quite the same as the right hand; it remains other. Yet, Foucault adds 
something to this unclosable relation that we do not find in Merleau-Ponty. 
Foucault conceives the auto-affective relation as one of violence (and 
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therefore of power).20 If there is something like a concept of the flesh in 
Foucault, the violence of the relation makes the concept different from that 
of Merleau-Ponty. In Foucault, the flesh contains the cry of death. The 
companion (who looks to be a double of me, as Eurydice and the sirens look 
to be doubles or reflections of Orpheus and Ulysses) is a power that “pushes 
back and away,” and therefore it is dangerous, a menace. One must keep it 
at a distance – the companion does not accompany -- since the companion 
might absorb and plunge one into “boundless confusion” and madness.21 
The companion is not a person with an interiority; it is impersonal. 
Although the companion is not a privileged interlocutor – it is a mere “it” -- 
it is a demand to which one is never equal and a weight one would like to be 
free of. The companion is the imperative of a law that can never be obeyed. 
Thus even as the companion, the double, Eurydice and the sirens push back 
and away, they also, as Foucault says, attract.22 
Like the song of the sirens, the outside attracts and calls, and, when it 
attracts, it makes one undergo the presence of the outside. Undergoing the 
presence of the outside, one realizes that one is “irremediably” outside of the 
outside.23 One is irremediably outside of the outside because the outside is 
“weak.” It is not a thing with which one can do something, it is not a statute 
that can be enforced or applied; it does nothing since it is nothing.24 One is 
irremediably outside of the outside because the outside is not an inside to 
which one could find an entrance. The irremediable impossibility of gaining 
access to the outside brings us to the central characteristic of the experience 
we have been describing thanks to Foucault’s essay: the experience of 
powerlessness. Indeed, in “The Thought of the Outside,” Foucault suggests 
that the experience is even one of suffering.25 One suffers because, as one 
advances towards the outside, it withdraws from the place to which one has 
advanced. Because the outside pushes back and away, because it eludes our 
grasp and withdraws, we who are attracted must, as Foucault says, be 
negligent. Negligence is the negation of any singular form. These singular 
forms (thoughts already thought, meanings already made, institutions 
already constructed) must be forgotten. As forgetfulness, negligence 
resembles the experience of dying: these singular forms must be destroyed if 
one is to try to reach the outside. But like Orpheus and Ulysses, the 
experience is not death. One must approach as closely as possible without 
entering into the danger of confusion and madness. Thus while forgetting, 
one must wait. On the other side of forgetting is awaiting. Here Foucault is 
again quite close to Heidegger. Waiting for Foucault must be a “pure 
waiting,” that is, it must be a waiting for nothing in particular, just as 
“profound boredom” in Heidegger is boredom with nothing in particular. 
Because one is waiting for nothing in particular, it is not certain that what 
comes is that for which one is really waiting. Thus, one must be attentive, 
even zealous, and multiply the efforts to wait for what is radically new or so 
old that it has never been seen before. Such an event, however, never 
happens as such. As soon as the event appears, it appears as someone, as 
L e o n a r d  L a w l o r  |  9 7  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XIX, No 1 (2011)  |  jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2011.481 
something, and then it is no longer an event of the outside; appearing as 
something or someone, the outside is no longer the outside. We must not 
expect the origin to return; we must wait for the promise to be fulfilled. 
Thus, as with Heidegger, Foucault suggests a kind of messianism without a 
messiah. 
The experience to which Foucault is leading us is the experience of 
attraction-withdrawal. In the experience, one responds with awaiting-
forgetting. Awaiting-forgetting is therefore a specific sort of thinking. In 
“The Thought of the Outside,” Foucault (when he speaks of commentary in 
Blanchot) describes the thinking as one that welcomes the outside into its 
words; it lets them enter.26 Thus, again like Heidegger, this thinking is based 
on a kind of attentive listening to a voice that is nearly mute. This voice is 
what Merleau-Ponty, quoting Valéry, has called “the voice of no one.” As 
Foucault says, commentary, the kind of writing or speaking required for 
awaiting-forgetting, is nothing more than “the repetition of what the outside 
has never stopped murmuring.”27 The discourse therefore faithful to 
awaiting-forgetting engages in a kind of thinking that no longer interiorizes 
itself. What is required then is a thought of (the) nothing, of nothing formal 
or singular. Or, more precisely, what is required is a thought of a singularity 
that immediately unravels itself, that immediately makes itself continuous 
with other singularities. As we already noted, the thought of the outside is 
the thought of multiplicity. In order to think the outside, one must not say “I 
am thinking of my thoughts.” What is required is not the “folding over,” the 
“repli,” of the “of.” What is required is the unfold, the “depli,” of “I am 
thinking….” In the openness of the unfold, one is thinking of or listening to 
or writing about the murmuring voices. In the thought of the outside 
therefore one finds oneself “enveloped in a nameless voice.”28 
 
The Deconstruction of Auto-Affection and its Implications 
Thanks to our investigation of Foucault’s “The Thought of the Outside,” 
we are able to see now that the research agenda for what we call 
“continental philosophy” can be summed up in one sentence. This kind of 
philosophy aims to construct a discourse that leads us to an experience that 
puts ourselves in question. In other words, it aims to invent concepts that 
lead us to an experience that transforms how we think of ourselves, that 
transforms who we are and what we do. The experience is the experience of 
powerlessness. Leading us to the transformative experience, we must first 
negate and destroy anything that might count as a simple, undifferentiated, 
pure, and static presence. That is, we must deconstruct anything that might 
count as an origin or an end, anything that might count as a foundation or 
ground, such as God, truth, the good, or nature. Anything that suggests the 
metaphysics of presence must be criticized and overcome. We must then 
affirm non-presence and groundlessness, which means that we must affirm 
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immanence. Our starting point then is no different from that of Descartes in 
the first two meditations: “I am thinking, I am thinking about…, I am 
thinking about my own ideas.” The starting point therefore is auto-affection. 
Auto-affection is not a deliberate act of reflection through which an object 
called the self is given in a representation. Below reflection and as its origin 
is the basic experience of my own thoughts. As we know, since Plato’s 
Theaetetus, thinking has been defined by means of an interior monologue 
(189e-190a): hearing oneself speak. The auto-affection called “hearing 
oneself speak” seems to include two aspects. On the one hand, I seem to 
hear myself speak at the very moment that I speak and without delay; and, on 
the other, I seem to hear my own self speak and not someone or something 
other. Let us now examine the particular experience of hearing oneself 
speak. 
 When I engage in interior monologue, when, in short, I think -- it seems 
as though I hear myself speak at the very moment I speak. It seems as 
though my interior voice is not required to pass outside of myself, as though 
it is not required to traverse any space, not even the space of my body. So, 
my interior monologue seems to be immediate, immediately present, and 
not to involve anyone else. Interior monologue seems therefore to be 
different from the experience of me speaking to another and different from 
the experience of me looking at myself in the mirror, where my vision has to 
pass through, at the least, the portals of my eyes. It is important to hear the 
“seems” in the preceding sentences. We are now going to deconstruct the 
appearances in order to expose the essential structure or process below what 
is apparent or believed. So, the problem with the belief that interior 
monologue (in a word, thought) is different from other experiences of auto-
affection is twofold. On the one hand, the experience of hearing oneself 
speak is temporal (like all experience). The “timing” of interior monologue 
means that the present moment involves a past moment, which has elapsed 
and which has been retained. It is an irreducible or essential necessity that 
the present moment comes after, a little later; it is always involved in a 
process of mediation. The problem therefore with the belief that interior 
monologue happens immediately (as if there were no mediation involved) is 
that the hearing of myself is never immediately present in the moment when 
I speak; the hearing of myself in the present comes a moment later; there is a 
delay between the hearing and the speaking. This conclusion means that my 
interior monologue in fact resembles my experience of the mirror image in 
which my vision must traverse a distance that differentiates me into seer and 
seen. I cannot, it is impossible for me to hear myself immediately. 
But there is a further implication. The distance or delay in time turns 
my speaking in the present moment into something coming second. 
Temporalization implies that the present is not an origin all alone; it is 
compounded with a past so that my speaking in the present moment is no 
longer sui generis. Therefore it must be seen as a kind of response to the past. 
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The fact that my speaking is a response to the past leads to the other 
problem with the belief that interior monologue is my own. Beside the 
irreducible delay and distance involved in the experience of auto-affection, 
there is the problem of the voice. In order to hear myself speak at this very 
moment, I must make use of the same phonemes as I use in communication 
(even if this monologue is not vocalized externally through my mouth). It is 
an irreducible or essential necessity that the silent words I form contain 
repeatable traits. This irreducible necessity means that, when I speak to 
myself, I speak with the sounds of others. In other words, it means that I 
find in myself other voices, which come from the past: the many voices are 
in me. I cannot – here we encounter the experience of powerlessness -- it is 
impossible for me to hear myself speak all alone. There is a multivocality, a 
sort of murmur or clamor coming from the past. Others’ voices contaminate 
the hearing of myself speaking.29 Just as my present moment is never 
immediate, my interior monologue is never simply my own. 
This description shows that auto-affection is based on a formal structure 
at work in the “timing,” but also the, so to speak, “spacing” of auto-
affection, a structure consisting of two contradictory elements. On the one 
hand, there is always a present moment, a kind of event, a point, a 
singularization. Each thought I have, as I speak it, has a kind of novelty to it, 
giving it a singular location. On the other, however, the singularity of the 
thought is connected back to some other thoughts in the past or in some 
other place. As the description shows, each thought is necessarily composed 
of traits already used in the past, traits standing nearby. Time temporalizes 
or endures and space spatializes or distances by means of two forces, the 
force of repetition and the force of singularization, the force of universality 
and the force of event. These two elements of repetition (or universality) and 
singularization (or event) are irreducibly connected to one another but 
without unification. In other words, these two forces are necessarily bound 
to one another and necessarily dis-unified.30 The paradoxical relation of the 
two elements or forces implies that auto-affection is really, necessarily, 
hetero-affection. It implies that immanence dissolves into multiplicity; that 
the inside is in the outside (or the outside contaminates the inside); that, 
instead of an “I,” there is a “we”; and that, instead of us thinking we have 
the power to hear ourselves speak (the very ground of autonomy), we find 
ourselves in an experience of inability. The necessity of these two forces is so 
strong that we are powerless not to obey their commands, even though their 
commands cannot be reconciled. We must singularize and we must 
universalize. 
Let us be more precise about implications that follow from this 
deconstruction. First, experience as the experience of the present is never a 
simple experience of something present over and against me, right before 
my eyes in a clear intuition; there is always another force, another element, 
another agency there. Repetition contains what has passed away, distant, 
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and no longer present and what is about to come, from a distance, and is not 
yet present. The present therefore is always complicated by non-presence. 
Above, we called this minimal repeatability a trait; the trait refers to a kind 
of proto- and informal linguisticality that refers back to nothing but other 
traits. Second, if the experience of the present is always complicated, then 
nothing is ever given as such. Whatever is given is given as other than itself, 
as already past or as still to come. What becomes “foundational,” we might 
say is this “as.” Or what becomes “foundational” is the “of” of “the thought 
of … nothing (present as such).” That is, what becomes foundation is a 
transitivity that, suspending its object, goes to infinity. Third, if the 
“foundation” is transitivity to infinity, then the proto-linguisticality of the 
trait is nothing but an informal (below the forms of meanings and 
propositions) murmur, a collectivity of voices. Instead, of a unified “I,” an 
“auto,” we find a “we” that remains incomplete and absent. Fourth, the fact 
that transitivity to infinity (the two forces of event and repetition) have 
become foundational, this fact has disturbed the traditional structure of 
transcendental philosophy, which consists in a linear relation between 
foundational conditions and founded experience. In traditional 
transcendental philosophy, an empirical event such as what is happening 
right now is supposed to be derivative from or founded upon conditions 
that are not empirical. Yet, the deconstruction shows that the empirical event 
is a non-separable part of the structural or foundational conditions. Or, in 
traditional transcendental philosophy, the empirical event is supposed to be 
an accident that overcomes an essential structure. But we see now that this 
accident cannot be removed or eliminated. Fifth, if the “accident” cannot be 
eliminated, if “accident” has always already taken place, then we cannot 
speak of an origin in the traditional sense, a principle (or arche), a unitary 
starting point, complete in itself, an unprecedented beginning. Instead, the 
origin is always origin-heterogeneous, that is, the origin is heterogeneous 
from the start or what starts is itself heterogeneous to the very idea of origin. 
Likewise, if the “accident” cannot be eliminated, if “accident” always 
remains, then we cannot speak of an end in the traditional sense, a purpose 
(or telos), a unitary stopping point, complete in itself, with nothing left over. 
Instead, the end is always end-heterogeneous, that is, the end is 
heterogeneous finally or what finishes is heterogeneous to the very idea of 
end. Sixth, if there is no original principle and if there is no final purpose, 
then every experience contains an aspect of lateness and an aspect of 
earliness. Every experience is the experience of awaiting-forgetting. It seems 
as though I am late for the origin since it seems already to have disappeared; 
it seems as though I am early for the end since it seems still to come. Every 
experience then is not quite on time or in the right place. Experience, the 
experience exposed only by deconstruction, is “out of joint.” Being “out of 
joint,” commanding in ways that are irreconciliable, the experience is one of 
powerlessness, but, more explicitly, it is one of violence and injustice. 
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Conclusion: Further Questions 
It is precisely this “out of jointness” of the relation that raises further 
questions. Here is the most obvious and maybe the most pressing question. Is 
it necessary to conceive the relation of the two forces as one of violence? Is 
some other conception of the relation possible? It seems that we cannot 
conceive the relation strictly as peace or non-violence since the idea of peace, 
balance, equality, reconciliation, seems to imply a bringing to an end (or at 
least it implies the imagination of an end; this claim itself raises a question of 
whether we can indeed image an end in the strict sense). If peace means the 
end of experience, then reacting to the imbalance of the two forces with 
perfect peace seems to be the very worst sort of violence, complete violence, 
the end of everything. The question of the conception of the relation as 
violence leads to the question of reaction. Let us imagine -- maybe we can 
imagine nothing else -- that the relation between event and repetition 
remains forever unjust. The pain of loss in one’s heart always remains; we 
continue to suffer the anxiety, with neither protection nor reserve, almost to 
the point of madness, that the injustice is irremediable. Then, we must ask, 
how do we react to this necessary violence, this irreducible pain, this insane 
anxiety? As we just realized, it seems that we cannot react with perfect and 
complete peace. We must become something other than the reaction of the 
worst violence. Therefore, the question: is there then some other reaction 
hiding behind the “non” of non-violence? Is there some other power hiding 
behind the absence of power? Perhaps there is, and it amount to this: if we 
cannot stop the violence of repetition on the event, we can let it happen; if 
we cannot stop the violence of the event on repetition, we can let it happen. 
This letting happen means that we have the ability – the power, maybe – to 
be unable. We are able to obey the law of repetition (we must always await 
the repetition in each event, obligated thereby to forget each event); we are 
able to obey the law of singularization (we must always forget all the 
repetitions of events, obligated thereby to wait for another event). Is this 
obedience itself listening to the murmur of the outside? Is this obedience a 
welcoming of all the events across the border that divides while binding, 
welcoming all repetitions across the threshold that binds while dividing? 
Maybe this obedience would do the least violence. Nothing is certain, 
however. 
In this reaction of the least violence, we have opened the border of who 
we are to others, to all the others that haunt us from the past (they keeps 
coming back to us) and to all the others that wait for us in the future (they 
keep coming toward us). How are we to conceive this “we”? Even if we 
could do the very least violence, there would still be other events violated by 
repetition, there would still be other repetitions violated by the event. 
Because of this irremediable violence – but must it be irremediable? – this 
“we” cannot be unified and identical. A unified and identical “we,” a 
community at peace with itself, can never, therefore, be accomplished. The 
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people are lacking. They are therefore, always, still a people, a “demos,” to 
come. How are we to conceive this “we”? Minimally, we would recognize 
this people to come by the very fact that they question themselves. In this 
self-interrogation, the people to come would always become other than they 
are, going over border and limits or opening borders and limits. Will the 
people to come, therefore, include everyone, the whole world, and therefore 
the foreign, the migrating, the vagrant, the homeless, and even the beastly – 
in a word, will the people to come include the enemies? How can there be 
something like a society of friends that includes the enemies? And if we can 
imagine such a hyperbolic society of “friends” (including the whole world), 
of what are they friends? We cannot imagine any society that does not dwell 
on a land. There can be no people, no nation, no democracy without a land. 
They must have a place to dwell and be enveloped. Just as the people are 
always to come, the land, soil, the earth, is still to come. There is always 
more depth, more distance, more dimensions, to infinity. How are we to 
imagine this earth to come? Is it terra firma or is the soil shifting beneath our 
feet? Is it a utopia or a dystopia, a heterotopia? What is its element? Is it a 
desert or an ocean? Is the land an ark floating on the water or a fortress 
sitting on the sand? Is it a countryside or a city? Is it a terrain of pastures or 
mountains? Is it a finely segmented city or a city of porous walls? Does it 
have a name? Do the people who might dwell on this land have a name? If 
they have a name, can we call them forth? How? Can we imagine an 
artform, a literature, a letter, that addresses them? Can we invents concepts, 
create beliefs, a name that will make these dispersed living beings come 
together? 
There are no clear answers to these questions of violence, of a people to 
come, and a land to come. Yet, if we have been exposed to the experience of 
powerlessness, we sense that these questions have force. Like a law, they 
command us to think. Indeed, these questions have been formulated with 
the hope that they will bring about a renewal of thinking. Such a renewal is 
the very project of what we have been calling “continental philosophy.” 
Perhaps, these questions lead us “beyond continental philosophy.” Perhaps 
the attempts to answer them constitute something like “post-continental 
philosophy.” Whatever we call the next step in thinking, however, does not 
matter, as long as we remember the potentiality of these conceptual 
elements: (1) the starting point in immanence (where immanence is 
understood first as auto-affection, but then, when its appearances are 
deconstructed, it becomes the powerlessness of hetero-affection); (2) 
difference (where the relation in hetero-affection is conceived as violence 
between the forces of repetition and the forces of singularization); (3) 
thought (where the language in which we think is understood as an 
threatening murmur); and (4) the overcoming of metaphysics (where 
metaphysics is understood as a mode of thinking that reacts to the murmur 
with the worst violence, and overcoming is understood as the creation of a 
new mode of thinking, imagining, and inventing that calls forth a people to 
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come, friends of the least violence, dwelling in a land to come). If we do not 
forget the potentiality of these elements, if we hold to a remembering that 
obliges us to forget the forms of them, then perhaps these elements have the 
power to lead us out of the present philosophical situation. 
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